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Abstract
Differential privacy is a popular privacy model within the research
community because of the strong privacy guarantee it offers, namely that
the presence or absence of any individual in a data set does not signif-
icantly influence the results of analyses on the data set. However, en-
forcing this strict guarantee in practice significantly distorts data and/or
limits data uses, thus diminishing the analytical utility of the differen-
tially private results. In an attempt to address this shortcoming, several
relaxations of differential privacy have been proposed that trade off pri-
vacy guarantees for improved data utility. In this work, we argue that
the standard formalization of differential privacy is stricter than required
by the intuitive privacy guarantee it seeks. In particular, the standard
formalization requires indistinguishability of results between any pair of
neighbor data sets, while indistinguishability between the actual data set
and its neighbor data sets should be enough. This limits the data con-
troller’s ability to adjust the level of protection to the actual data, hence
resulting in significant accuracy loss. In this respect, we propose indi-
vidual differential privacy, an alternative differential privacy notion that
offers the same privacy guarantees as standard differential privacy to in-
dividuals (even though not to groups of individuals). This new notion
allows the data controller to adjust the distortion to the actual data set,
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which results in less distortion and more analytical accuracy. We propose
several mechanisms to attain individual differential privacy and we com-
pare the new notion against standard differential privacy in terms of the
accuracy of the analytical results.
1 Introduction
The development of information technologies has boosted the collection of data
about individuals. Data stores containing personal data are a valuable resource
to support decision making both in the public and the private sector. However,
individuals have growing concerns on the use of their potentially sensitive data.
In order to guarantee the fundamental right of individuals to privacy, appro-
priate data protection measures to limit disclosure risk must be implemented
before making data available for analysis.
Essentially, two main approaches exist in statistical disclosure control [1, 2]
to limit the disclosure risk: (i) non-interactive protection, whereby a protected
version of the original data set collected from the data subjects is generated and
released, and (ii) interactive protection, whereby a user-queried data analysis is
performed on the original data set, and then a protected version of the results is
returned to the user. When the type of data analysis is not known at the time of
data protection, the former approach is the only viable solution; however, for a
fixed data analysis known beforehand, interactive protection should be preferred
as it allows adjusting the level of protection to the analysis being performed,
which makes it possible to maximize the accuracy of the results.
In this work, we focus on the interactive setting, which differential privacy [3]
has substantially advanced. The main contribution of differential privacy is
the strong privacy guarantee it provides: while it does not prevent disclosure,
it guarantees that a disclosure is equally likely whether or not any particular
individual contributes her data. This is diametrically opposed to the aim of
privacy models focusing on the non-interactive setting [4, 5, 6, 7], which seek to
provide absolute guarantees against specific types of intruders (with a specific
knowledge on the data to be protected). The problem of the latter models
is that real intruders may differ from the specific intruders considered by the
models; in particular, real intruders may know more than assumed.
However, despite its popularity among researchers and the step forward it
offers in terms of privacy guarantees, differential privacy is only being deployed
to a limited extent in real-world applications. The basic reason is the poor
accuracy/utility of differentially private results. Except for a number of well-
behaved applications (queries that are stable to modification of one record),
differential privacy has too large an impact on utility for it to be widely used in
data analysis/mining (see related remarks in Section 3). This is also confirmed
by the amount of relaxations of differential privacy that have been proposed
(see Section 3), which seek to improve the accuracy of the results by trading it
off against privacy guarantees.
In any case, the intuition behind differential privacy, that is, “the presence or
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absence of an individual in a data set should not significantly modify the results
of the analysis”, is very adequate for disclosure risk limitation: if the data on an
individual have a significant impact on the results of an analysis, most probably
the privacy of this individual is at risk. Thus, intuitively, differential privacy
ensures the data are adequately protected.
However, we argue here that the standard formalization of differential pri-
vacy is stronger (and, thus, leads to more data distortion and less useful results)
than what the above data protection intuition requires. This can be seen from
two different but related points of view:
• Differential privacy assumes the presence of a trusted party that holds the
data set, receives queries submitted by the users and returns differentially
private results for these queries. In the standard differential privacy formu-
lation, the trusted party is not allowed to use its knowledge of the actual
data set when computing the noise to be added to the query response in
order to protect privacy.
• Differential privacy provides provable privacy guarantees to groups of data
subjects (in addition to those that derive from the guarantees given to
each data subject individually). These guarantees for groups go beyond
the previously mentioned intuition behind differential privacy, which is
about protecting single individuals.
While being more demanding than required by the intuitive notion of differential
privacy may be meaningful, we argue in the following sections that enforcing
an actually stronger privacy notion may have a significant negative impact on
the accuracy/utility of the protected results. Thus, if data utility is a priority,
the suitability of including additional guarantees (i.e., group-based differential
privacy) should be carefully pondered. Besides, in statistical disclosure control,
the goal is to prevent accurate inferences on single individuals, but accurate
inferences on groups (statistical and aggregate computations) are usually viewed
as legitimate analyses.
In this line, we propose here individual differential privacy, a novel formaliza-
tion of differential privacy that is aligned with the intuitive differential privacy
guarantees. Our approach limits the protection to the individuals in the data
set (as suggested in the intuitive notion), rather than extending it to groups of
individuals (as formalized in the standard definition of differential privacy). In
practice, this means that the trusted party managing the data can make use of
its knowledge of the actual data set at the time of query response and down-
wardly adjust the distortion to the actual data; as a consequence of the lower
data distortion, the accuracy/utility of the protected results can be significantly
improved in comparison with the standard formulation of differential privacy.
Nonetheless, we will also indicate how to extend individual differential pri-
vacy to group differential privacy, in case the data controller wants to offer
privacy guarantees for groups while still leveraging his knowledge on the actual
data set when computing the distortion to be added for protection.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
on the standard formulation and the usual mechanisms to attain differential pri-
vacy. Section 3 reviews related work aimed at improving the accuracy/utility
of differentially private results and highlights the differences with our approach.
In Section 4, we present and formalize our individual differential privacy model
and in Section 5 we propose several mechanisms to satisfy it that exploit its less
strict formulation to reduce data distortion. Section 6 analyzes the accuracy
of individually differentially private results of several common queries and com-
pares their accuracy against the one obtained using standard differential privacy.
The final section presents the conclusions along with some future research lines.
2 Background on Differential Privacy
Differential privacy was originally proposed in [3] as a privacy model for the
interactive setting, that is, to protect the results of queries to a database. In
this setting, a differentially private sanitization mechanism sits between the user
submitting queries and the database controller answering them. To preserve
the privacy of individuals, the sanitization mechanism must guarantee that the
contribution of each individual’s data to a query result is limited (according to
an  parameter).
Definition 1 (-differential privacy). A randomized function κ gives -differential
privacy (or -DP) if, for all data sets D1 and D2 that differ in one record (a.k.a.
neighbor data sets), and all S ⊂ Range(κ), we have
Pr(κ(D1) ∈ S)≤ exp() Pr(κ(D2) ∈ S).
Let D be the data set that is to be protected. Given a query f , the goal
in DP is to find an approximation to f that satisfies the privacy requirements
stated in Definition 1. Let us call κf such an approximation. The value of
κf (D) is then returned as the query result, instead of the actual value f(D).
In the following, we refer to the differentially private condition in terms of
indistinguishability: the distributions of the responses to the queries between
data sets that differ in one record are similar.
An interesting property of DP, which the privacy models in the k-anonymity
family (k-anonymity [4], l-diversity [5], t-closeness [6], etc.) do not have, is
composition: composing several differentially private results still satisfies DP,
although with a different  parameter value. Several composition theorems have
been stated. The most basic ones are:
Theorem 1 (Sequential composition). Let κ1 be a randomized function giving
1-DP and κ2 a randomized function giving 2-DP. Then, any deterministic
function of (κ1, κ2) gives (1 + 2)-DP.
Theorem 2 (Parallel composition). Let κ1 and κ2 be randomized functions
giving -DP. If κ1 and κ2 are applied to disjoint data sets or subsets of records,
any deterministic function of (κ1, κ2) gives -DP.
4
This is a preprint of http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2017.2663337
The computational mechanism to attain DP is often called a differentially
private sanitizer. Differentially private mechanisms for numerical data can be
seen as noise addition mechanisms that, rather than returning the actual query
value f(D), mask it by adding some noise. The amount of noise that needs
to be added depends on the variability of the query function between neighbor
data sets. This noise may be: (i) independent of the data set, which requires
adjusting the noise to the maximum variability between neighbor data sets, or
(ii) dependent on the data set, which allows adjusting the level of noise to the
variability of f in the actual data set.
2.1 Noise calibration to the global sensitivity
The global sensitivity measures the maximum variability of a function between
neighbor data sets.
Definition 2 (l1-sensitivity (a.k.a. global sensitivity)). The l1-sensitivity of a
function f : D → Rk is
∆f = max
x,y∈D
d(x,y)=1
‖f(x)− f(y)‖1 ,
where d(x, y) means that data sets x and y differ in one record.
In calibration to the global sensitivity, DP is attained by adding a noise to
the query response that is proportional to the global sensitivity; that is, the
maximum variability of the query response in the domain of the data. Several
noise distributions are possible (e.g. the Laplace distribution [8], the optimal ab-
solutely continuous distribution [9], and the discrete Laplace distribution [10]).
For the sake of conciseness, we focus on the commonly used Laplace distribution.
Proposition 1. Let f be a query function with values in Rk. The mecha-
nism κf (X) = f(X) + (N1, . . . , Nk), where Ni are independent and identically
distributed random noises drawn from a Laplace(0, /∆f) distribution, is -
differentially private.
2.2 Noise calibration to the smooth sensitivity
Even if the variability of the query function in the actual data set is small,
quite often its variability in the data domain (i.e., global sensitivity) is large. In
these cases, the use of a noise calibrated to the global sensitivity may seriously
and unjustifiedly damage data, but a data-dependent noise may still permit
accurate results. Given a data set D, the variability of a function between D
and its neighbor data sets is known as the local sensitivity.
Definition 3 (Local sensitivity [11]). Let f be a function that is evaluated at
data sets and returns values in Rk. The local sensitivity of f at D is
LSf (D) = max
y:d(y,D)=1
‖f(y)− f(D)‖1 .
5
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Obviously, the global sensitivity upper-bounds the local sensitivity. More-
over, the local sensitivity is usually small, except for especially ill-conditioned
data sets. In this case, the gap between the global and the local sensitivity can
be large. This is illustrated in the following example for a function that returns
the median of a list of values.
Example 1. Consider a data set X = {x1, . . . , xn}, where each record cor-
responds to a value in {0, 1}. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the
number of records is odd, say n = 2m + 1, so that the median corresponds to
a single record, the m + 1-th record. The global sensitivity of the median is 1,
since we can consider the neighbor data sets:
{0,m+1. . . , 0, 1, m. . ., 1} → median = 0,
{0, m. . ., 0, 1,m+1. . . , 1} → median = 1.
The local sensitivity is, except for the two previous data sets, always 0. The
reason is that, except for the previous data sets, changing the value of a record
does not modify the median.
In most cases, releasing the value of a query with a magnitude of noise pro-
portional to the local sensitivity (rather than the global sensitivity) would result
in a significantly more accurate response. However, using the local sensitivity
in mechanisms designed for global sensitivity does not yield DP.
Example 2. Consider the data sets: {0,m+2. . . , 0, 1,m−1. . . , 1} and {0,m+1. . . , 0, 1, m. . .
, 1}. In both cases the median is 0, but the local sensitivity differs; it is 0 in the
first case and 1 in the second one:
median local sensitivity
X = {0,m+2. . . , 0, 1,m−1. . . , 1} 0 0
X ′ = {0,m+1. . . , 0, 1, m. . ., 1} 0 1
Given that the local sensitivity for X is 0, adding a noise proportional to the
local sensitivity does not modify the median; thus, the probability of getting 1
is 0. For -DP to be satisfied, the probability of getting 1 for X ′ must also be 0.
However, that is not the case, since the local sensitivity for X ′ is different from
0.
The previous example shows that the amount of noise used to protect a
data set should not only be proportional to its local sensitivity but also take
into account the local sensitivity of neighbor data sets. Considering the local
sensitivity of neighbor data sets leads to the notion of smooth sensitivity.
Definition 4 (Smooth sensitivity). For β > 0 and a data set D ∈ D, the
β-smooth sensitivity of f at D is defined as
Sf,β(D) = max
y∈D
(LSf (y) exp(−βd(D, y))).
The greater the parameter β, the smaller the dependence of the smooth
sensitivity on the local sensitivity of neighbor data sets. Thus, the amount
6
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of noise required to attain -DP must depend on other factors apart from the
smooth sensitivity. In particular, a special kind of distributions, known as (α, β)-
admissible distributions [11], must be used. The downside of these distributions
is that they are heavy-tailed.
3 Related Work
Even though DP is appreciated for the strong privacy guarantees it offers, its
practical deployment is hampered by the poor accuracy offered by differentially
private mechanisms.
Works that discuss the accuracy limitations of differentially private results
in different contexts include [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Although these accuracy issues
have hindered the practical adoption of DP, they have also boosted further
research to find fixes. This research has taken two main lines: (i) to come up
with novel differentially private mechanisms that improve the accuracy of the
results, and (ii) to propose relaxations of DP that require less data distortion
and allow for more accurate results.
An outcome of the first line is the design of general mechanisms that improve
accuracy with respect to the basic Laplace noise addition mechanism. In [11],
the calibration of Laplace noise to the global sensitivity of the data is replaced
by the calibration of suitable noises to the smooth sensitivity. On the other
hand, the authors of [9] showed that the Laplace distribution is not optimal to
attain DP based on calibration to the global sensitivity. They described and
constructed the optimal absolutely continuous distributions: essentially, a dis-
tribution is optimal if the probability mass is as concentrated as possible around
zero given the DP constraints. Other outcomes of the first line of research are
mechanisms that are less sensitive. In [17, 18, 19], several methods based on
microaggregation of records are proposed to generate differentially private data
sets. In [20], the dependence between attributes is analyzed to reduce the dimen-
sionality in the computation of differentially private histograms. Other works
that try to improve the accuracy in histogram publication are [21, 22]. In [23], a
differentially private alternative to the ID3 algorithm for learning decision trees
is proposed.
The second line of research, focused on finding relaxations of DP, has been ac-
tive since the inception of DP. In [24], the concept of δ-approximate -indistinguishability
is presented (a.k.a. (, δ)-indistinguishability in [11]). This relaxation allows
some additional margin δ to the requirements in DP. In [25], the notion of
(, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy (a.k.a. (, δ)-pdp) is proposed. Rather
than allowing some additional margin, it requires -DP to be satisfied with
probability greater than 1 − δ. In other words, the probability that the adver-
sary gains significant information about an individual is, at most, δ. Yet another
relaxation is given in [15], who assume that confidential data become less sensi-
tive over time, which allows relaxing privacy parameters for older data. In [26],
a relaxation is presented that restricts the definition of neighbor data sets: they
are no longer data sets differing in any record, but in a record within a cer-
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tain subset. In [27], an alternative relaxation of DP, called (µ, τ)-concentrated
differential privacy, is proposed. Similarly to (, δ)-pdp, concentrated differen-
tial privacy allows the ratio of probabilities to be arbitrarily large with a small
probability that is determined by the parameters µ and τ .
In all the above relaxations, the accuracy gain is obtained by allowing the
differentially private condition to be broken: the presence or absence of an
individual may leak some information, although not too much or only with a
small probability. The relaxation that we propose in the next section is different
in the sense that the privacy guarantees for individuals envisioned in the original
definition of DP are preserved.
4 Individual differential privacy
The existing relaxations of DP violate strict DP because, under some circum-
stances, they permit the probability of responses to differ significantly between
neighbor data sets. In this section, we take a different approach to improve
data accuracy/utility. Rather than proposing another relaxation, we analyze
the intuitive privacy guarantees that DP seeks to capture and we suggest an
alternative definition that allows exactly attaining these privacy guarantees and
nothing more.
4.1 Intuitive view of differential privacy
As introduced above, DP assumes the presence of a trusted party that: (i)
holds the data set, (ii) receives the queries submitted by the data users, and
(iii) responds to them in a privacy-aware manner.
We described in Section 2 that the standard notion of DP is formalized in
terms of indistinguishability of the response to queries between neighbor data
sets. However, prior to this formalization, [3] provided an intuitive description
of the privacy guarantees aimed at by DP:
Any given disclosure will be, within a small multiplicative fac-
tor, just as likely whether or not the individual participates in the
database. As a consequence, there is a nominally higher risk for
the individual who participates, and only a nominal gain for the
individual who conceals or misrepresents her data.
Thus, individuals should not be reluctant to participate in the data set. After
all, the risk of disclosure is only very marginally increased by participation.
Providing relative (rather than absolute) privacy guarantees is the only sen-
sible approach to deal with intruders having arbitrary side knowledge. Absolute
privacy guarantees against arbitrary side knowledge are incompatible with re-
leasing accurate statistics. This is illustrated in [3] with a simple example about
the height of an individual I: if the intruder knows that the height of I is two
inches above the average height of the population of a country, then releasing
an accurate approximation of the average height of the population provides the
8
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intruder with an accurate estimate of I’s height. Here it is important to no-
tice that such disclosure happens even if I does not participate in the data set.
Thus, the disclosure is not associated to I’s participation in the data set, but
to the accurate side knowledge. This illustrates that differential privacy cannot
guarantee that disclosure will not happen; what it guarantees is that, should
disclosure happen, it will not be due to the participation of any particular indi-
vidual.
4.2 Formalization of individual differential privacy
DP is the result of formalizing the intuitive view of privacy described in Sec-
tion 4.1 into a rigorous mathematical definition. However, the fact that in this
formalization (see Definition 1) results are required to be indistinguishable be-
tween any pair of neighbor data sets is more stringent than required by the
intuitive view of privacy that is described above. Let us explain this in greater
detail.
Consider an individual I who has to decide between participating in a data
set or not. To neutralize any reluctance by I to disclose her private information,
I is told that query answers based on the data set will not allow anyone to
learn anything that was not learnable without I’s presence; this is precisely the
intuitive privacy guarantee DP offers. Although DP controls the access to a
data set regardless of the way the data were collected (either through voluntary
participation or not), thinking in terms of voluntary participation is clarifying:
we can think that an individual accepts to participate if she regards privacy
protection as sufficient.
To attain such privacy guarantees, DP requires the response to be indistin-
guishable between any pair of neighbor data sets. While such a requirement
yields the target privacy guarantees indeed, it is an overkill because, in reality,
queries are not answered on an arbitrary data set, but on the actual data set
held by the trusted party. In other words, if D is the collected data set, the tar-
get privacy guarantees can be attained by just requiring indistinguishability of
the responses between D and its neighbor data sets. Notice that, although the
data set D is not known until all the individuals have made their decisions about
participating/contributing to it, the presence of a trusted party that controls
the access to D makes it possible to give the previously described indistinguisha-
bility guarantees. After all, the data set D is known to the trusted party at the
time of query response.
According to the previous discussion, we propose the following privacy model,
which we call -individual differential privacy.
Definition 5 (-individual differential privacy). Given a data set D, a response
mechanism κ(·) satisfies -individual differential privacy (or -iDP) if, for any
data set D′ that is a neighbor of D, and any S ⊂ Range(κ) we have
exp(−) Pr(κ(D′) ∈ S) ≤ Pr(κ(D) ∈ S)
≤ exp() Pr(κ(D′) ∈ S).
9
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In line with Definition 1, we require the probability of any result to differ
between neighbor data sets at most by a factor of exp(). However, unlike in
Definition 1, the role of the data sets D and D′ is not exchangeable: D refers to
the actual data set, andD′ to a neighbor data set ofD. The asymmetry between
D and D′ is relevant, because indistinguishability is achieved only between D
and its neighbor data sets. As a side effect of this asymmetry, we need to
explicitly enforce an upper bound (Pr(κ(D) ∈ S)≤ exp() Pr(κ(D′) ∈ S)) and a
lower bound (exp(−) Pr(κ(D′) ∈ S)) ≤ Pr(κ(D) ∈ S)). This was not needed in
Definition 1 because the upper bound could be obtained from the lower bound
by exchanging the roles of D and D′.
To illustrate the implications of the differences between DP and iDP, consider
a data set D whose records are either 0 or 1, and assume that we query the
data set for the median. We consider two cases, D1 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 1} and D2 =
{0, 0, 0, 1, 1}, which are discussed next:
• In data set D1, the median is 0. Moreover, the median remains 0 after
modification of any single record. Since the median is unaffected by the
contribution of any single individual, there is no way to learn anything
about an individual from the median of D1. Hence, according to iDP, the
median of D1 can be released without any masking. This is not the case
according to DP, where the mere existence of a pair of neighbor data sets
(not involving D1) with different values for the median requires masking
it (even if the median of D1 discloses nothing about any individual).
• In data set D2, the median is 0, but a change in a single record is enough
for the median to become 1. Since a single individual may affect the result
of the median, information about an individual might be learned from the
value of the median. To limit the risk of disclosure, both DP and iDP
require masking the outcome of the median.
In the previous example, we have considered boundary cases where the
change of a single record can make it necessary or unnecessary to mask the
query result. Let us now consider a different case, consisting of a data set D3
with 99 binary records, of which 90 contain the value 1. Clearly, no single in-
dividual has any effect on the median of D3. Thus, iDP does not require any
masking for the answer to the median query. In contrast, under DP the pos-
sible existence of a data set D4 containing forty-nine 0s and fifty 1s has to be
considered, in which a single individual can change the median; since this data
set must be indistinguishable from its neighbors given the value of its median,
the answer to the median query must be masked even for D3 (although D3 and
D4 are far from neighbors).
Like in DP, two different notions of neighbor data sets D and D′ are possible
in iDP. We can either think of D′ as a data set generated from D by modifying
one record or as a data set generated from D by adding or removing one record.
Although such a choice can make some difference in terms of query answers,
both alternatives are similar as far as disclosure risk limitation is concerned. In
the sequel, we assume that D′ is generated from D by modifying one record.
10
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Strictly speaking, individual differential privacy is a relaxation of DP where
indistinguishability is only required between the actual data set D and its neigh-
bor data sets. Thus, the following holds:
Proposition 2. Any mechanism that satisfies -DP also satisfies -iDP for any
actual data set D.
However, unlike other relaxations in the literature, individual differential
privacy preserves the strict privacy guarantees that DP gives to individuals. In
this sense, rather than being regarded as a relaxation, individual differential
privacy can be construed as a more precise formalization of the intuitive notion
of privacy described in Section 4.1.
Even though we can satisfy -iDP by resorting to the mechanisms commonly
used to satisfy -DP, doing so would squander the potential accuracy gains of
-iDP. The reason is that, as discussed in Section 2, being able to adjust the
noise to the actual data set may significantly reduce its magnitude. In Section 5,
we design mechanisms that are specific to -iDP.
4.3 Disclosure limitation for groups of data subjects
If -iDP offers all the intuitive privacy guarantees of -differential privacy while
allowing more accuracy, it is because -iDP offers nothing more than those in-
tuitive guarantees. Let us discuss this issue here.
Even if DP seeks to protect privacy by limiting the impact of each single
individual on a query response, Definition 1 also results in (limited) privacy
guarantees for groups of individuals. For example, if data sets D1 and D3 differ
in two individuals (two records), by considering the intermediate data set D2
that differs in one individual from D1 and in one individual from D3, we have
Pr(κ(D1) ∈ S) ≤ exp() Pr(κ(D2) ∈ S),
Pr(κ(D2) ∈ S) ≤ exp() Pr(κ(D3) ∈ S),
which results in
Pr(κ(D1) ∈ S) ≤ exp(2) Pr(κ(D3) ∈ S).
That is, -DP guarantees that the knowledge gain for groups of two individ-
uals is limited by the factor exp(2). More generally, the knowledge gain for a
group of n individuals is limited by the factor exp(n).
In contrast, with iDP, the fact that the response mechanism is adjusted
to each concrete data set makes the concatenation of inequalities not possible.
Specifically, for the data sets D1, D2 and D3 above, iDP provides the upper
bounds
Pr(κ(D1) ∈ S) ≤ exp() Pr(κ(D2) ∈ S),
Pr(κ′(D2) ∈ S) ≤ exp() Pr(κ′(D3) ∈ S),
where κ is a mechanism whose distortion is calibrated on D1 and κ′ is a mech-
anism whose distortion is calibrated on D2. Note that the probability on the
11
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right-hand side of the first inequality does not match the probability on the
left-hand side of the second inequality.
Therefore, with iDP we lose any direct privacy guarantees for groups of
individuals. In other words, any disclosure risk limitation for a group that may
subsist under -iDP is an indirect consequence of the disclosure risk limitation
obtained by each individual in the group.
Direct group privacy guarantees not being part of the intuitive notion of DP
(which is aimed at individuals), but rather a by-product of the formalization in
Definition 1, we drop such group guarantees in order to improve data utility.
However, the proposed iDP could be modified to retain privacy guarantees for
groups of individuals, by requiring indistinguishability between the data set D
and the data sets D′ that differ from D in a group of records, as follows.
Definition 6 ((1, . . . , n)-group differential privacy). Given a data set D, a
response mechanism κ satisfies (1, . . . , n)-group differential privacy (denoted
(1, . . . , n)-gDP) if, for any data set D′ at distance i ∈ {1, . . . , n} from D, and
any S ⊂ Range(κ) it holds
exp(−i) Pr(κ(D′) ∈ S) ≤ Pr(κ(D) ∈ S)
≤ exp(i) Pr(κ(D′) ∈ S).
Notice that, in general, the level of protection for groups should be smaller
than for individuals. For example, in DP, the  parameter grows linearly with
the cardinality of the group and, thus, the level of indistinguishability decreases
exponentially with the size of the group. As a result, even in standard DP,
protection for groups of individuals is only noticeable for small values of  (which
on the other hand severely damage data utility) and for small groups. To attain
an equivalent level of protection with gDP, it must be i = i for i ∈ N.
4.4 Composition theorems
The composition theorems for DP described in Section 2 are also trivially sat-
isfied by individual differential privacy.
Theorem 3 (Sequential composition). Let κ1 be a mechanism giving 1-iDP
and κ2 a mechanism giving 2-iDP. Then, any deterministic function of (κ1, κ2)
gives 1 + 2-iDP.
Theorem 4 (Parallel composition). Let κ1 and κ2 be mechanisms giving -
iDP. If κ1 and κ2 are applied to disjoint data sets or subsets of records, any
deterministic function of (κ1, κ2) gives -iDP.
The proofs of the theorems for iDP are not detailed because they are straight-
forward adaptations of the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 for DP.
4.5 Privacy axioms
In [28], an axiomatization of the notions of privacy and utility is proposed. In
particular, two desirable properties of privacy models are described: the axiom
of transformation invariance and the privacy axiom of choice.
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The axiom of transformation invariance says that post-processing of sanitized
data must be safe as long as no sensitive information is incorporated into the
post-processing.
Definition 7 (Axiom of transformation invariance). Suppose we have a pri-
vacy definition, a privacy mechanism M that satisfies this definition, and a
randomized algorithm A whose input space is the output space ofM and whose
randomness is independent of both the data and the randomness in M . Then
M ′ = A◦M must also be a privacy mechanism satisfying that privacy definition.
Proposition 3. -iDP satisfies the axiom of transformation invariance.
Proof. Let M be an -iDP mechanism, and let A be a randomized algorithm
whose input space is the output space of M and whose randomness is indepen-
dent of both the data and the randomness in M . According to [28], we can
think of M and A as returning independent probability distributions. That
is, M : D → Dist(E) assigns to each data set D a probability distribution
over E such that, for each D′ that differs in one record from D, we have
exp(−) Pr(M(D′) ∈ S) ≤ Pr(M(D) ∈ S) ≤ exp() Pr(M(D′) ∈ S). On the
other hand, A : E → Dist(F ) assigns to each e ∈ E a probability distribution
over F .
To check that exp(−) Pr(A(M(D′) ∈ S))≤ Pr(A(M(D)) ∈ S)≤ exp() Pr(A(M(D′)) ∈
S), we decompose Pr(A(M(d)) ∈ S) as ∫
x∈S Pr(M(d) = y) Pr(A(y) = x) and
we use that M satisfies -iDP.
The privacy axiom of choice allows randomly choosing between -iDP mech-
anisms.
Definition 8 (Privacy axiom of choice). LetM1 andM2 be privacy mechanisms
that satisfy a certain privacy definition. For any p ∈ [0, 1], let Mp be a random-
ized algorithm that, on input i, outputs M1(i) with probability p (independent
of the data and the randomness in M1 and M2) and M2(i) with probability
1− p. Then Mp is a privacy mechanism that satisfies the privacy definition.
Proposition 4. -iDP satisfies the privacy axiom of choice.
Proof. Let M1 and M2 be -iDP mechanisms, and let p ∈ [0, 1]. Let Mp be a
mechanism that, on input i, outputs M1(i) with probability p and M2(i) with
probability 1− p.
We want to check that Mp is -iDP. That is, for any D′ neighbor of D, we
have exp(−) Pr(Mp(D′) ∈ S) ≤ Pr(Mp(D) ∈ S) ≤ exp() Pr(Mp(D′) ∈ S).
This is easily seen by expressing Pr(Mp(D) ∈ S) as p× Pr(M1(D) ∈ S) + (1−
p)× Pr(M2(D) ∈ S) and using that both M1 and M2 satisfy -iDP.
5 -iDP for Numerical Queries
In DP, response mechanisms for numerical queries are often expressed in terms
of noise addition (see Section 2). In this line, given a numerical query f , this
13
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section presents an -iDP mechanism of the form κ(x) = f(x) +N , where N is
a random noise.
For κ(x) = f(x)+N to be -iDP, we have to make sure that the result of the
mechanism is indistinguishable between D and its neighbor data sets. As we
show later, this can be done by adjusting the noise to the local sensitivity LSf (D)
(see Definition 3). The ability to calibrate the noise to the local sensitivity
rather than to the global or smooth sensitivities is a significant advantage to
preserve data utility: first, many functions have small local sensitivity but large
global sensitivity, as noted right after Definition 3 above; second, calibration to
the local sensitivity also improves the accuracy of query responses with respect
to calibration to the smooth sensitivity, not only because the local sensitivity
is smaller than the smooth sensitivity, but also because calibration to the local
sensitivity allows using exponentially decreasing noise distributions (rather than
the heavy-tailed distributions required by calibration to the smooth sensitivity).
Last but not least, calibration to the local sensitivity is simpler than calibration
to the smooth sensitivity.
We next detail how to enforce iDP for both continuous and discrete numerical
results.
5.1 Laplace mechanism
The Laplace(µ, b) distribution (a.k.a the double exponential distribution) is an
absolutely continuous distribution whose density function is
Lµ,b(x) =
1
2b exp
(
−|x− µ|
b
)
,
where µ is the location parameter, and b is the scale parameter. We use Lb(x)
when the mean parameter is zero.
In case of using the Laplace distribution to generate the random noise, iDP
can be rewritten as follows.
Proposition 5. Let f be a query function that takes values in Rk. The mech-
anism κ(x) = f(x) + (N1, . . . , Nk), where Ni are independent identically dis-
tributed Laplace(0, LSf (D)/) random noises, gives -iDP.
Proof. If N is a vector of independent Laplace(0, β) distributed variables, we
know that for all s ∈ Rk
exp
(
−‖z − z
′‖1
β
)
≤ Pr(z +N = s)Pr(z′ +N = s) ≤ exp
(‖z − z′‖1
β
)
.
Let D′ be a data set that differs from D in one record. By taking z = f(D),
z′ = f(D′), and β = LSf (D)/ we get
exp(−) ≤ Pr(f(D) +N = s)Pr(f(D′) +N = s) ≤ exp().
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5.2 Discrete Laplace mechanism
The previous mechanism (based on adding random noise with values in R) is
also capable of providing DP to query functions with values in Z. However,
for such query functions the use of a noise distribution with support over Z is
a better option. The discrete version of the Laplace distribution is defined as
follows.
Definition 9 (Discrete Laplace distribution [10]). A random variable N follows
the discrete Laplace distribution with parameter α ∈ (0, 1), denoted by DL(α),
if for all k ∈ Z,
Pr(N = i) = 1− α1 + αα
|i|.
The discrete Laplace distribution can also be used to attain -iDP. To this
end, the parameter α must be adjusted to the desired privacy level  and to the
local sensitivity LSf (D) of the query.
Theorem 5 (The discrete Laplace mechanism). Let f be a function with values
in Zk. The discrete mechanism κD(x) = f(x)+N , where N = (N1, . . . , Nk) and
Ni ∼ DL(exp(−/LSf (D))) are independent random variables, gives -iDP.
Proof. If N is a vector of independent DL(α) distributed variables, we know
that for all s ∈ Zk
α‖z−z′‖1 ≤ Pr(z +N = s)Pr(z′ +N = s) ≤ α
−‖z−z′‖1 .
Let D′ be a data set that differs from D in one record. By taking z = f(D),
z′ = f(D′) and α = exp(−/LSf (D)), we get
exp(−) ≤ Pr(f(D) +N = s)Pr(f(D′) +N = s) ≤ exp().
6 Evaluation
In this section, we compare the accuracy obtained with the standard DP def-
inition and with iDP for basic noise addition mechanisms. In particular, we
compare calibration to the global sensitivity (for DP), to the smooth sensitiv-
ity (for DP), and to the local sensitivity (for iDP). Noise addition mechanisms
provide simple ways to make an output compliant with DP (or iDP) and are
agnostic to the specific data uses; hence, using standard noise addition mecha-
nisms is relevant to make a general comparison between DP and iDP.
Since the accuracy we obtain from standard DP calibrated to the smooth
sensitivity and from iDP calibrated to the local sensitivity depends on the actual
data set, a purely empirical evaluation carried out on some sample data sets
would only provide a partial picture. Therefore, we give both an empirical
15
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analysis based on simulations and a theoretical analysis. We will see that, even
in the worst case, iDP offers a significant improvement on the accuracy of the
responses.
6.1 Median
The median is a measure of central tendency. Compared to the arithmetic
mean, the median is quite stable, because it is relatively insensitive to outliers.
Since statistical queries like the median represent properties of the data set
rather than properties of a specific individual, we could expect DP to provide
accurate results for such queries. However, the fact that standard DP guarantees
must hold for any pair of neighbor data sets forces noise addition mechanisms
to significantly degrade accuracy. Instead, iDP allows adjusting the amount
of protection to each specific data set; thus, most of the times, iDP yields
reasonably high accuracy, as we discuss below.
6.1.1 Differential privacy via calibration to the global sensitivity
Let the values x1, · · · , xn, with n = 2m+1, be instances of an attribute with do-
mainDom(A). Consider data setsD1 andD2 such that: inD1 values x1, . . . , xm
are equal to the minimum of Dom(A), and values xm+1, . . . , xn are equal to the
maximum of Dom(A); and in D2 values x1, . . . , xm−1 are equal to the minimum
of Dom(A), and values xm, . . . , xn are equal to the maximum of Dom(A). As
a result, the median xm in D1 is the minimum of Dom(A), and the median xm
in D2 is the maximum of Dom(A); thus, the global sensitivity for the median is
∆(median) = max(Dom(A))−min(Dom(A)).
Having a global sensitivity equal to the domain size severely compromises the
accuracy of differentially private estimations of the median via calibration to
the global sensitivity. The situation becomes even worse when the domain of
the attribute is not naturally bounded (e.g. incomes are unbounded, even if
the income of most individuals falls within a given window); in such cases, it
may not even be possible to compute the global sensitivity without artificially
restricting the values to a fixed interval.
6.1.2 Differential privacy via calibration to the smooth sensitivity
Calibration to the smooth sensitivity tries to avoid the shortcomings of global
sensitivity by adjusting the amount of noise to each data set. From [11], the
smooth sensitivity for the median is
Smedian,(D) =
= max
k=0,...,n
{exp(−k) max
0≤t≤k+1
{xm+t − xm+t−k−1}}.
Calibration to the smooth sensitivity is effective at reducing the amount of noise
that is added to most data sets. However, it still has some drawbacks:
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• Computing the smooth sensitivity can be complex. In particular, the
formula for the smooth sensitivity of the median has time complexity
O(n2), which may not be feasible for large data sets.
• Similarly to the global sensitivity, the smooth sensitivity can only be com-
puted when Dom(A) is bounded.
• The mechanisms used to attain DP are more complex than with global
sensitivity, and the eligible noise distributions are heavy-tailed (rather
than the exponentially decreasing distributions used in calibration to the
global sensitivity).
6.1.3 iDP (via calibration to the local sensitivity)
iDP also allows the response mechanism to be independently adjusted to each
data set. iDP can be reached via calibration to the local sensitivity (see Sec-
tion 5). For the median, the local sensitivity is:
LSmedian(D) = max{xm − xm−1, xm+1 − xm}.
iDP via calibration to the local sensitivity offers the following advantages com-
pared to calibration to the smooth sensitivity:
• The computation of the local sensitivity is less complex.
• The local sensitivity is lower than the smooth sensitivity.
• The local sensitivity does not depend on the size of the domain. It only
depends on xm−1, xm and xm+1.
• The mechanism used to attain iDP is simpler and the noise distributions
can be selected to be exponentially decreasing (e.g. the Laplace distribu-
tion).
6.1.4 Experimental comparison between DP with smooth sensitivity
and iDP
After the previous theoretical comparison, we now turn to experimental eval-
uation of the accuracy for the median. Due to the poor accuracy provided by
calibration to the global sensitivity, the comparison focuses on DP via calibra-
tion to the smooth sensitivity and iDP via calibration to the local sensitivity.
For iDP, we have used the mechanism proposed in Proposition 5. For stan-
dard DP, we have used a noise N having a density of the form
fN (x) ∝ 11 + |x|γ ,
where γ > 1. This noise distribution is ( 4γ ,

γ )-admissible to achieve DP cali-
brated to the smooth sensitivity [11].
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Figure 1: Comparison of the noise distributions required by -DP via calibration
to the smooth sensitivity (for γ = 2 and γ = 3, where γ is the noise parameter)
and -iDP via calibration to the local sensitivity (with a Laplace distribution),
where the query is the median,  = 1 and sensitivities are 1.
Table 1: 95% confidence intervals of the noise distributions required by -DP via
calibration to the smooth sensitivity (for different values of the noise parameter
γ) and -iDP via calibration to the local sensitivity (with a Laplace distribution),
where the query is the median,  = 1 and sensitivities are 1.
Privacy model -iDP -DP γ = 2 -DP γ = 3
95% interval [-3,3] [-101.7,101.7] [-34.2,34.2]
In the comparison, we take  = 1 and we assume that the local sensitivity
equals the smooth sensitivity. Since i) noise in DP is proportional to the smooth
sensitivity, ii) noise in iDP is proportional to the local sensitivity, and iii) the
latter sensitivity is never greater than the former, both sensitivities being equal
is the worst case for iDP. Specifically, we take both sensitivities equal to 1.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the noise in the response. Even in the most
favorable case for the smooth sensitivity, the accuracy obtained with iDP is
much better. The reason is that, to enforce -DP via calibration to the smooth
sensitivity, the noise distribution must be heavy-tailed. Table 1 shows 95%-
confidence intervals for these noise distributions.
These results show that the use of calibration to the smooth sensitivity may
be incompatible with an accurate and -differentially private approximation for
the median. Although the smooth sensitivity is definitely better than the global
sensitivity for noise calibration, at 95% confidence the amount of noise can be
as large as 101 times the smooth sensitivity. Whether this is acceptable depends
on the data set. Only if the smooth sensitivity is very small compared to the
attribute domain, accuracy may still be acceptable. In contrast, the accuracy
provided by iDP is much better: at 95% confidence, the noise is at most 3 times
the local sensitivity.
Finally, we evaluate the accuracy of the median by computing, for a col-
lection of data sets, the average absolute error incurred; we use the absolute
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error because the relative error may be misleading when the median is close to
0. We consider data sets with three different sizes (10, 100, and 1000) whose
records are drawn from U [0, 1] (the uniform distribution in [0, 1]), N(0, 1) (the
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1) and Exp(1) (the exponential
distribution with rate 1).
For the smooth sensitivity to be finite, the domain of the records must be
bounded. Thus, to be able to compute the smooth sensitivity in the N(0, 1)
and the Exp(1) cases, we have to restrict the domain of the data. This is done
by bounding the domain to the range between the minimum and the maximum
values in the data set. Figure 2 shows the average absolute error for each of the
data sets. We include the results obtained for DP by adjusting the noise to the
smooth sensitivity with γ = 3, and for iDP by adjusting a Laplace noise to the
local sensitivity. We took γ = 3 as the best performing value after evaluating
several other values of γ; specifically, smaller values led to too much probability
mass in the tails, whereas greater values introduced greater correction factors
to the noise distribution that offset the gain produced by having the probability
mass closer to zero. By looking at the figure, we notice that, regardless of the
underlying data distribution and the data set size, the results are significantly
better for iDP.
6.2 Maximum
Rather than comparing the accuracy obtained with different mechanisms in a
baseline scenario, this example focuses on the maximum value of a data set and
shows how iDP is useful to avoid calibrating the noise to a domain-dependent
(and hence too large) sensitivity.
6.2.1 Differential privacy via calibration to the global sensitivity
The global sensitivity of the maximum of a set of values equals the length of
the domain. Let us consider data sets D1 and D2 such that: in D1, all the
values x1, . . . , xn are equal to the minimum of Dom(A), and in D2 the values
x1, . . . , xn−1 are equal to the minimum of Dom(A), and the value xn is equal
to the maximum of Dom(A). Thus, the global sensitivity for the maximum is
∆(maximum) = max(Dom(A))−min(Dom(A)).
Like in the case of the median, having a global sensitivity equal to the do-
main size severely degrades the accuracy of differentially private estimations of
the maximum via calibration to the global sensitivity. Also, if the domain is
unbounded, the global sensitivity cannot even be computed.
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This is a preprint of http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2017.2663337
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
iDP
DP Γ=3
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
iDP
DP Γ=3
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
iDP
DP Γ=3
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
5
10
15
20
25
30
iDP
DP Γ=3
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
iDP
DP Γ=3
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
iDP
DP Γ=3
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
5
10
15
20
25
30
iDP
DP Γ=3
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
iDP
DP Γ=3
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
iDP
DP Γ=3
Figure 2: Absolute error in the median (y-axis) for  in the range [0.5, 1] (x-axis)
and several data sets. Data sets have been drawn from a specific distribution:
U [0, 1] (top row graphs), N(0, 1) (middle row graphs) and Exp(1) (bottom row
graphs). Data set sizes are 10 (left column graphs), 100 (middle column graphs),
and 1000 (right column graphs). Especially in the left column graphs, it can be
seen that strict DP yields completely off-range median values for all considered ,
as the median of a U [0, 1] must be within [0, 1], and, with very great probability,
the median of a N(0, 1) is within [−3, 3] and the median of an Exp(1) is within
[0, 5]. Clearly, iDP is much more utility-preserving.
20
This is a preprint of http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2017.2663337
6.2.2 Differential privacy via calibration to the smooth sensitivity
The smooth sensitivity for the maximum can be computed as
Smaximum,(D) =
max
k=0,...,n
{exp(−k)(max(Dom(A))− xn−k),
exp(−k)(xn − xn−k−1)}.
Calibration to the smooth sensitivity is effective to reduce the amount of noise
that is added to most data sets. In fact, except for the worst-case data sets de-
scribed when computing the global sensitivity, the smooth sensitivity is smaller.
However, the smooth sensitivity does not avoid the dependence on the domain
of the attribute.
6.2.3 iDP (via calibration to the local sensitivity)
The local sensitivity of the maximum can be computed as
LSmaximum(D) = max{max(Dom(A))− xn, xn − xn−1}.
While iDP offers the expected advantages (the local sensitivity is smaller than
the smooth sensitivity, and we can use exponentially decreasing noise distribu-
tions), the local sensitivity still depends on the domain of the attribute, which
can be unbounded. However, iDP allows an easy workaround to solve this issue:
rather than querying for the maximum value, we can query for the second max-
imum. Unless there is a single record that has a significantly greater value (as
in the worst-case data set described above), querying for the second maximum
should be a reasonably good approximation; otherwise, the approximation will
be very inexact, but, anyway, the accuracy when querying for the maximum
would also be poor. The advantage of querying for the second maximum is that
the local sensitivity does not depend on the domain anymore:
LS2−max(D) = max{xn − xn−1, xn−1 − xn−2}.
It is important to note that this workaround to avoid having a sensitivity that
depends on the domain attribute is not possible with calibration to the smooth
sensitivity.
6.3 Range queries
Given a data set D and a range R, a range query counts the number of records
of D that are contained in R:
fR(D) = |{x ∈ D : x ∈ R}| .
Range queries behave well under DP: their sensitivity is 1. This low sensitiv-
ity is preserved in histogram queries (a collection of range queries over disjoint
ranges).
21
This is a preprint of http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2017.2663337
The mechanisms to attain -iDP described in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 were based
on calibrating the noise to the local sensitivity at D. As the local sensitivity
of fR at any D is 1, which is equal to the global sensitivity, the use of these
mechanisms does not provide improved accuracy w.r.t. DP.
7 Conclusions and future work
This work formalizes and discusses individual differential privacy, an alternative
to the standard formulation of DP that reduces the noise to be added to the
query results and, thus, better preserves their accuracy/utility. While, at first
sight, individual differential privacy may look like another relaxation of DP,
it exactly maintains the intuitive disclosure limitation guarantee of DP: the
presence or absence of one individual in the data set must be unnoticeable from
the query result. Improving the accuracy of the results is possible because
individual differential privacy exploits the fact that the actual data set is known
by the trusted data controller at the time of answering queries. By focusing
only on indistinguishability between the actual data set and its neighbor data
sets, the sensitivity of the query and, and hence, the magnitude of noise to be
added significantly decrease.
We have also proposed several mechanisms to attain individual differential
privacy. First, we have explained that any mechanism providing -DP also
provides -individual differential privacy. However, direct use of -differentially
private mechanisms fails to reap the potential accuracy improvements of individ-
ual differential privacy. Next, we have shown that, for numerical queries, -iDP
can be attained by adjusting the noise to the local sensitivity, which results in
substantial accuracy gains:
• Since the local sensitivity is normally significantly smaller than the global
sensitivity employed by standard DP, iDP leads to substantially better
accuracy.
• Even if noise is calibrated to the smooth sensitivity, iDP still offers much
better accuracy and this for two reasons: (i) the local sensitivity is smaller
than the smooth sensitivity (although the difference is not as important
as with respect to the global sensitivity); (ii) exponentially decreasing
random noise can be used with local sensitivity (in contrast with the
heavy-tailed noises that are to be employed with calibration to the smooth
sensitivity).
In addition to improved accuracy, iDP via local sensitivity is less dependent on
the attribute domain (which may be large or even unbounded); what is more,
in case the local sensitivity depends on the domain, workarounds can be found.
In our opinion, the significant accuracy/utility gains brought by -iDP, to-
gether with its strong privacy guarantee (the same intuitive privacy guarantee
of -DP for individuals), pave the way to using -iDP where standard DP is
not viable. As future work, we plan to study the performance of iDP for other
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common queries in the interactive scenario. We also plan to design mecha-
nisms, other than noise addition, that may offer improved utility for specific
tasks. Specifically, we aim at mechanisms for non-numerical discrete functions
that leverage the advantages of iDP. Finally, we also plan to apply -iDP to
non-interactive data releases. Although such releases provide more flexibility re-
garding data uses, they have been traditionally neglected by researchers because
of the enormous distortion that making them differentially private according to
the standard definition would entail [18].
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